#!/bin/bash # Copyright © Cloud Linux GmbH & Cloud Linux Software, Inc 2010-2018 All Rights Reserved # # Licensed under CLOUD LINUX LICENSE AGREEMENT # http://cloudlinux.com/docs/LICENSE.TXT ################################################## # Common functions # ################################################## VERSION="2.0" common_current_date=`date +%Y-%m-%d` function getLogFile(){ #1 - common path if [ ! -e "$1/logs" ];then mkdir -p "$1/logs" fi current_date_time=`date +"%Y-%m-%d %k:%M:%S"` echo "$1/logs/$common_current_date.log" } function writeToLog(){ #1 - message #2 - common path if [ ! -e "$2/logs" ];then mkdir -p "$2/logs" fi current_date_time=`date +"%Y-%m-%d %k:%M:%S"` prg=`basename "$0"` local logfile="$2/logs/$common_current_date.log" # Refuse to append through a symlinked log path: a writable logs/ dir lets an # attacker plant a symlink so the root-run >> redirects into an arbitrary # file. Skip the write silently (callers must stay robust), don't error out. if [ -L "$logfile" ]; then return 0 fi echo "[$current_date_time from $prg] $1" >> "$logfile" } function writeFileToLog(){ #1 - file path #2 - common path if [ ! -e "$2/logs" ];then mkdir -p "$2/logs" fi current_date_time=`date +"%Y-%m-%d %k:%M:%S"` prg=`basename "$0"` local logfile="$2/logs/$common_current_date.log" # Refuse to append through a symlinked log path: a writable logs/ dir lets # an attacker plant a symlink so the root-run >> redirects into an arbitrary # file. Skip the write silently (callers must stay robust), don't error out. if [ -L "$logfile" ]; then return 0 fi echo "[$current_date_time from $prg] ----------------File Content $1 BEG---------------" >> "$logfile" if [ -e "$1" ];then cat "$1" >> "$logfile" fi echo "[$current_date_time from $prg] ----------------File Content $1 End---------------" >> "$logfile" } function removeEmptyStringsFromFile(){ filename="$1" # A privileged caller may hand $1 a path under an attacker-influenced # directory; bash > redirection and sed both follow symlinks with no # O_NOFOLLOW. Refuse to operate on a symlink so the truncating write cannot # be redirected to an arbitrary target. Quote $filename against word-splitting. if [ -L "$filename" ]; then return 1 fi res=`sed -e '/^$/d' "$filename"` echo "$res" > "$filename" } # Guard for deleteAllExcept/deleteAllInclude: $3 is fed verbatim to sed as the # PROGRAM, so restrict it to a single-address delete/print (/regex/d or /regex/p). # Closes the GNU sed e/w/r/W/s///e arbitrary-write/exec surface. All shipped # callers pass /#TOKEN/d (e.g. /#CageFS/d, /#l.v.e-manager/d). function _isSafeSedAddressScript(){ #1 - candidate sed program local _re='^/[^/]*/[dp]$' [[ "$1" != *$'\n'* && "$1" =~ $_re ]] } function deleteAllExcept(){ #1 - hook #2 - tmp name #3 - pattern #4 - common path if [ ! -e "$4/tmp" ]; then mkdir -p "$4/tmp" fi if [ -e "$1" ];then # The cat read, the truncating `echo > "$1"` and the `cat >> "$1"` # below follow a symlink at $1 with no O_NOFOLLOW; refuse so the # root-run rewrite cannot be redirected to (and clobber) an arbitrary # target via a planted link. if [ -L "$1" ]; then writeToLog "deleteAllExcept: refusing symlink hook path $1" "$4" return 1 fi if ! _isSafeSedAddressScript "$3"; then writeToLog "deleteAllExcept: refusing unsafe sed program for $1: $3" "$4" return 1 fi cat "$1" | sed -n "$3" > "$4/tmp/$2.tmp.$$" echo "#!/bin/bash" > "$1" cat "$4/tmp/$2.tmp.$$" >> "$1" rm -f "$4/tmp/$2.tmp.$$" fi } function deleteAllInclude(){ #1 - hook #2 - tmp name #3 - pattern #4 - common path if [ ! -e "$4/tmp" ]; then mkdir -p "$4/tmp" fi if [ -e "$1" ];then # The cat read and the truncating `cat tmp > "$1"` below follow a # symlink at $1 with no O_NOFOLLOW; refuse so the root-run rewrite # cannot be redirected to (and clobber) an arbitrary target via a # planted link. if [ -L "$1" ]; then writeToLog "deleteAllInclude: refusing symlink hook path $1" "$4" return 1 fi if ! _isSafeSedAddressScript "$3"; then writeToLog "deleteAllInclude: refusing unsafe sed program for $1: $3" "$4" return 1 fi cat "$1" | sed "$3" > "$4/tmp/$2.tmp.$$" cat "$4/tmp/$2.tmp.$$" > "$1" rm -f "$4/tmp/$2.tmp.$$" fi } function showBar { # showBar feeds $1 into `let` arithmetic below; bash evaluates array # subscripts during arithmetic, so require a plain integer first. [[ "$1" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || return 1 nmb=$(cat $0 | grep showBar | wc -l) let "nmb = $nmb" let "prct = $1 * 30 / $nmb" let "prct_n = $1 * 100 / $nmb" prg=`basename "$0"` echo -n "$prg: [" >&2 for bar in {1..30} do if [ $bar -le $prct ];then echo -n "#" >&2 else echo -n " " >&2 fi done echo -ne "] ($prct_n%)\r" >&2 } function get_command(){ command=$(which $1) if [ $? != 0 ]; then writeToLog "Can't execute command $1..." exit 1; fi echo $command } function createHookHeader(){ #1 - hook name #2 - modificator #3 - common path if [ ! -e "$3/tmp" ]; then mkdir -p "$3/tmp" fi # Refuse a symlinked hook path: the > create, chmod and mv -f below all # follow symlinks with no O_NOFOLLOW, so a planted link would redirect the # root-run truncating write / mode change to an arbitrary target. if [ -L "$1" ]; then writeToLog "createHookHeader: refusing symlink hook path $1" "$3" return 1 fi # $1 (hook path) and $2 (modificator) are interpolated UNESCAPED into a # root-run wrapper line and into the .bak path of mv. Restrict $2 to a safe # token and reject shell metacharacters / control chars in $1 so neither can # break out of the generated `..bak "$@"` command line. if [[ ! "$2" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$ ]]; then writeToLog "createHookHeader: refusing unsafe modificator for $1: $2" "$3" return 1 fi if [[ "$1" == *[[:cntrl:]]* || "$1" == *[\'\"\\\`\$\;\&\|\<\>\(\)]* ]]; then writeToLog "createHookHeader: refusing unsafe hook path $1" "$3" return 1 fi if [ ! -e "$1" ]; then echo "#!/bin/bash" > "$1" chmod 755 "$1" else chmod 755 "$1" tmp=`/bin/sed -n '/#\!\/bin\/\(ba\)\?sh/p' "$1"` if [ -z "$tmp" ];then /bin/grep -q "$1.$2.bak" "$1" if [ $? = 1 ];then mv -f "$1" "$1.$2.bak" echo "#!/bin/bash" > "$1" echo "'$1.$2.bak'"' "$@"' >> "$1" chmod 755 "$1" chmod 755 "$1.$2.bak" fi fi fi } function checkHookString(){ #1 - hook name #2 - pattern string #3 - comment srting if [ -e "$1" ];then # $2/$3 are appended verbatim to a root-run hook script; a newline or # other control char would land an uncommented command. A backslash is # rejected too: GNU sed's `1a` (used in addHookStringFirst) expands # backslash escapes (\n, \t) into real chars, so a control-char-free # `foo\ntouch X` would still split into a new line. Require a single # printable, escape-free line for each (no control chars, no backslash). if [[ "$2" == *[[:cntrl:]]* || "$2" == *\\* || "$3" == *[[:cntrl:]]* || "$3" == *\\* ]];then writeToLog "checkHookString: refusing control chars or backslash in hook line for $1" "`dirname "$1"`" return 1 fi # The cat read and the >> append below follow a symlink at $1 with no # O_NOFOLLOW; refuse so the root-run append cannot be redirected to an # arbitrary target via a planted link. if [ -L "$1" ]; then writeToLog "checkHookString: refusing symlink hook path $1" "`dirname "$1"`" return 1 fi tmp=`cat "$1" | grep "$2"` if [ -z "$tmp" ];then echo "$2 #$3" >> "$1" fi fi } function addHookStringFirst(){ #1 - hook name #2 - pattern string #3 - comment srting #4 - short hook name #5 - common path if [ -e "$1" ];then # The cat read and the truncating `cat tmp > "$1"` below follow a symlink # at $1 with no O_NOFOLLOW; refuse so the root-run rewrite cannot be # redirected to (and clobber) an arbitrary target via a planted link. if [ -L "$1" ]; then writeToLog "addHookStringFirst: refusing symlink hook path $1" "$5" return 1 fi # $4 is interpolated into a sed PROGRAM (/$4/d); restrict it to a bare # token so it cannot reach GNU sed e/w/r/W or close the address. if [[ ! "$4" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$ ]];then writeToLog "addHookStringFirst: refusing unsafe sed address token for $1: $4" "$5" return 1 fi # $2/$3 are appended via GNU sed `1a`, which expands backslash escapes # (\n, \t) in its text. A control-char-free `foo\ntouch X` would therefore # be split into a new, uncommented line in a root-run hook. Reject control # chars AND backslash so $2/$3 stay a single printable, escape-free line. if [[ "$2" == *[[:cntrl:]]* || "$2" == *\\* || "$3" == *[[:cntrl:]]* || "$3" == *\\* ]];then writeToLog "addHookStringFirst: refusing control chars or backslash in hook line for $1" "$5" return 1 fi cat "$1" | sed /$4/d | sed 1a"$2 #$3" > "$5/tmp/future_hook.tmp.$$" cat "$5/tmp/future_hook.tmp.$$" > "$1" rm -f "$5/tmp/future_hook.tmp.$$" fi } function getEasyApacheDir(){ if [ -e /usr/home/cpeasyapache ]; then echo "/usr/home/cpeasyapache" elif [ -e /home/cpeasyapache ]; then echo "/home/cpeasyapache" else echo "/var/cpanel/cpeasyapache" fi } function is_ea4(){ if [ -e '/etc/cpanel/ea4/is_ea4' ]; then return 0 else return 1 fi }